The concept of cyber-manufacturing systems (CMS) is at the nexus of manufacturing research advances by an interdisciplinary effort from engineering, computer science, and information science domains. Future manufacturing will increasingly be characterized as complex, networked cyber-physical systems that may be instantiated in one physical location or distributed across many. However, this vision of interconnected manufacturing environments ushers in the challenge of new security threats to production systems that still contain traditional closed legacy components.How to address system failures caused by cyber-attacks remains one of the main success factors in the widespread adoption of CMS. The aim of this research is to investigate the resilience of such systems in the face of cyber-attacks. Traditionally, "resilience"—a psychology and biology term—refers to the ability of an entity to withstand unforeseen environmental perturbations or disturbances while continuing performing its intended functions successfully. A resilient CMS then is one that can ensure the achievement of its operational goals under the advent of cyber-attacks with acceptable levels of security, integrity, and profitability. It is designed with an architecture that aids in the prevention of malicious external or internal threats, runs routinely anomaly detection jobs, systematically addresses the failure modes of its components, and isolates the disturbing effects because it can collapse the whole system. At the same time, it needs to be able to expel those malicious entities and fixes the vulnerabilities that allowed the cyber-attack. Furthermore, it needs to withstand the disturbance until is able to recover and return to its normal operational state.This paper explores the implementation of functions of resilience from (i) identification of vulnerabilities and threats origin (insiders and outsiders), (ii) the mapping of attack vectors and surfaces, (iii) the planning of failure mode responses, (iv)penetration testing and detection jobs, (v) trigger-based implementation of resilience measures, and the (vi) recovery of the system. Our main contribution is the analysis of the system dynamic of such measures under a set of cyber-attacks in order to determine the optimal set of measure to make a CMS resilient. By providing a framework to help transition a CMS from non-resilient to being resilient, the performance of such systems against known nondeterministic and varied cyber-attacks against its cyber physical components is compared. The investigation includes (i) simulations of disruptions in the system, targeting the most critical components. (ii) Estimation of the expected economic loss at each stage, as well as the time that it takes to identify and respond to the disruption. (iii) Attack recovery drills, aiming to reduce the time in which the system is back up. The results also aid in the identification of the best indicators to predict the performance of a CMS under attack.

Resilient Cyber-Manufacturing Systems Under Cyber Attacks

Paper Proceedings: https://asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/IMECE/IMECE2021/volume/85543

ASME 2021 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition (IMECE2021)

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